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Abstract
We estimate a dynamic programming model of schooling decisions in which
the degree of risk aversion can be inferred from schooling decisions. In our
model, individuals are heterogeneous with respect to school and market abil-
ities but homogeneous with respect to the degree of risk aversion. We allow
endogenous schooling attainments to aﬀect the level of risk experienced in labor
market earnings through wage dispersion and employment rate dispersion. We
ﬁnd a low degree of relative risk aversion (0.93) and the estimates indicate that
both wage and employment rate dispersions decrease signiﬁcantly with schooling
attainments. We ﬁnd that a counterfactual increase in risk aversion will increase
schooling attainments. Finally, the low degree of risk aversion implies that an
increase in earnings dispersion would have little eﬀect on schooling attainments.
Key Words: Dynamic Programming, Returns to Education, Risk Aversion, Hu-
man Capital, Earnings Dispersion
JEL Classiﬁcation: J2-J3.
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1 Introduction
The acquisition of general human capital through education is one of the most
important activities by which young individuals increase their potential lifetime
earnings. While enrolled in school, individuals typically receive parental sup-
port and give up current earnings in favor of potentially higher future earnings.
Parental transfers can take the form of housing services and other living expenses
(such as food and transportation) and are likely to be unaﬀected by those ran-
dom elements aﬀecting household income. As opposed to parental transfers,
which are most likely non-stochastic from the perspective of young individuals,
future earnings are usually unknown. Both wages and unemployment rates are
random variables that may vary over the life cycle and their distributions are
potentially aﬀected by human capital. Indeed, it is well known that schooling
can substantially reduce the incidence of unemployment over the life cycle and
also increase lifetime earnings.
The eﬀect of schooling on earnings dispersion (or wage and employment
rate dispersion) is however more diﬃcult to characterize. In stylized “implicit
contract” frameworks, in which risk averse individuals are willing to trade wage
rigidity against stable employment patterns, it is reasonable to assume that
there is less need for risk sharing among low educated workers who beneﬁt from
a relatively high level of social insurance. However, at the same time, wage
dispersion may also vary with factors such as union status, occupation type
and the like. As a consequence, the link between education and wage/earnings
dispersion is not trivial.1
Modeling the level of risk involved in schooling decisions must however go
beyond the eﬀect of human capital on wages and employment and the diﬀer-
ence in uncertainty between parental transfers and labor market wages. The
possibility of interruption in the schooling accumulation process, due to various
events such as health or personal problems, academic failure or other causes,
can increase the risk associated with schooling as perceived by economic agents.
This supplementary source of risk also needs to be taken into account when
modeling schooling decisions.
Quantifying the eﬀect of schooling on wage dispersion and employment dis-
persion is a complicated task. Indeed, a remarkably small number of authors
have analyzed the impact of earnings uncertainty on schooling decisions. At the
theoretical level, and in a standard two-period framework, Lehvari and Weiss
(1974) ﬁnd that income uncertainty will reduce schooling. Olson et al. (1979)
specify and estimate a tractable model in which individuals may borrow and
lend limited amount and must face a speciﬁc (and realistic) repayment scheme.
They also stress the fact that earnings uncertainty may depress human capi-
tal investment. In the earlier literature, a few descriptive analyses of empirical
age/earnings proﬁles have been carried out. Mincer (1974) investigates how
the variance of earnings diﬀers across schooling levels over the life cycle while
Chiswick and Mincer (1972) use age earnings proﬁle to investigate time series
changes in income inequality.
As it stands now, there is no strong empirical evidence on the eﬀect of ed-
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ucation on wage/earnings dispersion.2Most applied work has concentrated on
the correlation between schooling and the ﬁrst moment of the earnings distri-
bution. In the literature devoted to the returns to schooling, the parameters
of interest are often estimated from cross-section data. In such a framework,
it is not possible to distinguish between unobserved individual ability and true
wage dispersion and heteroskedasticity is usually ignored. Moreover, as school-
ing attainment is an endogenous variable, standard reduced-form techniques
are ill-equipped to address wage heteroskedasticity. As a consequence, model-
ing schooling decisions and earnings dispersion in a context which allows for
risk aversion requires the use of structural stochastic dynamic programming
techniques.
Although the estimation of structural dynamic programming of schooling de-
cisions has become increasingly popular (Keane and Wolpin, 1997; Eckstein and
Wolpin, 1999; Belzil and Hansen, 2002; Sauer, 2003), very few economists have
investigated schooling decisions in a framework which allows for risk aversion or
consumption smoothing.3Recently, labor economists (Cameron and Taber, 2001;
Keane and Wolpin, 2001; Sauer, 2003) have investigated the links between edu-
cation ﬁnancing and consumption smoothing and, more particularly, the eﬀects
of borrowing constraints on schooling decisions.4All of them present evidence
suggesting that borrowing constraints have virtually no impact on schooling
attainments. Empirical results reported in Cameron and Heckman (1998) also
suggest that borrowing constraints (and parental income) have very little im-
pact on schooling decisions as opposed to “long run factors”. However, as far as
we know, the relationship between earnings dispersion (wage and employment
rate volatility) and education has never been investigated.
Along with the subjective discount rate, the degree of risk aversion is one
of the most fundamental preference parameters. For instance, knowledge of the
degree of risk aversion can shed light on the welfare improvements of policies
aimed at reducing income ﬂuctuations over the business cycle. Until now, the
empirical literature devoted to the measurement of the degree of risk aversion
has been completely dominated by macroeconomists and ﬁnancial economists.
In ﬁnancial economics, the degree of risk aversion and the discount rate are
typically estimated in asset pricing frameworks using Euler equations. Usu-
ally, the estimates of the degree of relative risk aversion (within a power utility
framework) range between 3 and 10 and represent a relatively mild degree of
risk aversion. Indeed, these estimates are quite diﬃcult to reconcile with ac-
tual data on long run average returns on risky and risk-free assets.5Strangely
enough, labor economists have been completely absent from the debate. This is
surprising. In virtually all western countries, labor income accounts for a much
larger share of total income than does investment income and, until very re-
cently, macroeconomic policies have been aimed at reducing variations in labor
income.6As a consequence, measuring risk aversion from individual decisions
aﬀecting labor income appears a natural research agenda.
The main objectives of this paper are the following. First, it is to estimate
the degree of risk aversion from a dynamic programming model of education
choices in which individual preferences are set in an expected (non-linear) util-
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ity framework and in which current schooling decisions aﬀect lifetime earnings
(wage and employment rate) dispersion. The model is based on the assump-
tion that individual preferences are representable by an instantaneous power
utility function and that individuals maximize the expected discounted value of
lifetime utility over a ﬁnite horizon. Young individuals make optimal school-
ing decisions while taking into account that accumulated schooling aﬀects both
the ﬁrst and the second moments of the lifetime distribution of earnings. As a
consequence, the theoretical framework provides an opportunity to investigate
both the degree of risk aversion and the rate of time preference as separate
parameters7 .
The second objective is to evaluate how endogenous schooling attainments
aﬀect the variances of lifetime wages and employment rates. A third objective
is to investigate the relationship between risk aversion and education (how does
education change with a counterfactual change in risk aversion). Finally, our
last objective is to evaluate how young individuals react to changes in the wage
return to schooling, changes in school subsidies, changes in wage subsidies and
changes in earnings dispersion.
The model is implemented on a panel of young individuals taken from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). We ﬁnd that young individu-
als have a low degree of risk aversion. The parameter estimate of the degree
of relative risk aversion, 0.93, is just somewhat below the degree of risk aver-
sion consistent with logarithmic preferences (objective 1). At the same time,
our estimates of log wage and log employment rate regression functions indicate
that, after conditioning on individual speciﬁc unobserved ability, wage disper-
sion and employment rate dispersion are highly heteroskedastic. More precisely,
both wage and employment rate dispersions decrease with schooling (objective
2). This is consistent with the hypothesis that risk sharing agreements are
more common among highly educated (high wage) workers. We also ﬁnd that
a counterfactual increase in the degree of risk aversion will increase schooling
attainments (objective 3). Finally, the simulations indicate that schooling at-
tainments are relatively more elastic with respect to school subsidies than to the
return to schooling and, consistent with the low degree of risk aversion disclosed
in the data, that an increase in earnings dispersion (an increase in the overall
variance of wages and employment rates) will raise schooling by a relatively
small number (objective 4).
The content of this paper is as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the presen-
tation of the model while the empirical speciﬁcation is discussed in Section 3.
Section 4 contains a description of the data. After a discussion of the struc-
tural parameter estimates and the goodness of ﬁt (Section 5), the links between
risk aversion, risk and schooling are investigated in Section 6. In Section 7,
we present some elasticities of schooling attainments with respect to the re-
turn to schooling, school subsidies, wage subsidies and earnings risk. Finally,
conclusions are in Section 8.
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2 A Stochastic Dynamic Programming Model
The theoretical structure of the model is presented in Section 2.1 while the
solution is discussed in Section 2.2.
2.1 Theoretical Structure
Individuals are initially endowed with family human capital, innate ability and
preference parameters. Given their endowments, young individuals decide se-
quentially whether it is optimal or not to enter the labor market or to continue
accumulate human capital. The amount of schooling acquired by the beginning
of date t is denoted St. When in school, individuals receive income support,
denoted ξt. The income support should be interpreted as being net of learning
and psychic costs and it is implicitly aﬀected by individual abilities (ability in
school). It is assumed to be non-stochastic.8As argued before, this reﬂects the
fact that parental transfers can take the form of housing services and other liv-
ing expenses (such as food and transportation) and are typically unaﬀected by
those random elements aﬀecting household income.
We assume that individuals interrupt schooling with exogenous probability
ζ(St). The interruption state is meant to capture events such as illness, injury,
travel or simply academic failure and may vary with grade level. In practice,
it is diﬃcult to distinguish between a real interruption and an academic failure
as some individuals may spend a portion of the year in school and a residual
portion out of school, as a result of a very high failure probability. When an
interruption occurs, the stock of human capital remains constant over the period.
The NLSY does not contain data on parental transfers and, in particular, does
not allow a distinction in income received according to the interruption status.
As a consequence, we ignore the distinction between income support at school
and income support when school is interrupted.9
Each individual i is endowed with an instantaneous (per period) power utility
function. The expressions for the instantaneous utility of being in school, Us(.),
is as follows:
Us(ξit) =
ξ1−αit − 1
1− α (1)
Once the individual has entered the labor market, he no longer receives
parental support but receives a wage rate wit and an employment rate eit in-
stead. The total income ﬂow, while employed, is given by Zit = witeit.
The instantaneous utility of entering the labor market, Uw(.), is given by
Uw(Zit) =
Z1−αit − 1
1− α (2)
Individuals are risk averse (loving) when α > 0 ( α < 0). Wage and em-
ployment rates are therefore perfect substitutes. Each individual maximize his
expected discounted lifetime utility by choosing the optimal time to interrupt
schooling and enter the labor market. The discount factor, β, is equal to 11+ρ
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where ρ is the subjective discount rate. The time horizon, T , is ﬁnite and is
chosen to be when individuals turn 65 years old (a typical retirement age). Edu-
cation aﬀects both wage and employment rates and the wage regression equation
is given as
wit = exp(ϕw0 + ϕw1 (Sit) + ϕw2 Experit + ϕw3 Exper2it + εwit) (3)
where ϕ1(Sit) is a function that summarizes the local returns to schooling and
εwit ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σ2w(Sit))
is a stochastic shock that represents wage dispersion.
The employment rate equation is
eit = exp(κ0 + κ1Sit + κ2Experit + κ3Exper2it + εeit)
with
εeit ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σ2e(Sit))
which represents employment rate dispersion. The dependence of both σ2e(Sit)
and σ2w(Sit) on schooling attainment is crucial. It will allow us to measure how
schooling decisions may be linked to wage and employment dispersion.
It is convenient to summarize the return to schooling in the following equa-
tion
lnZit = ϕ0 + ϕ1(Sit) + ϕ2Experit + ϕ3Exper2it + εit
where
εit = εwit + εeit ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σ2(Sit))
ϕ0 = ϕw0 + κ0
ϕ1(Sit) = ϕw1 (Sit) + κ1Sit
ϕ2 = ϕw2 + κ2
ϕ3 = ϕw3 + κ3
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2.2 The Solution
It is well known that the solution to the stochastic dynamic problem can be
characterized using recursive methods. First, we must solve for the expected
instantaneous (per period) utility and, secondly, we need to isolate the stochastic
shocks (εit) in order to obtain a closed-form solution for the probability of
choosing to continue school or to enter the labor market.
The value functions associated with the decision to remain in school, V sit(Sit),
given that an individual has already acquired Sit years of schooling, can be
expressed as
V sit(Sit) =
ξ1−αit − 1
1− α + β

ζ(Sit)EV Iit+1(Sit+1)+
(1− ζ(Sit))EMax[V sit+1(Sit+1), V wit+1(Sit+1)]

=
ξ1−αit − 1
1− α + βE(Vit+1 | dit = 1) (4)
where dit = 1 when the individual is in school at date t and E(Vit+1 | dit = 1)
denotes the value of following the optimal policy in the next period (either re-
main at school or start working). The expectation is taken over the distribution
of potential labor market wages and employment rates.
Given the absence of distinction between income during school interruption
and income while at school, the value of entering a school interruption period,
V Iit(Sit), is expressed in a similar fashion as V
s
it(Sit).
The value of stopping schooling accumulation, which is the value of entering
the labor market with Sit years of schooling and no labor market experience, is
given by
V wit (Sit) =
(exp(ϕ0 + ϕ1(Sit) + εit))1−α − 1
1− α + βE(Vit+1 | dit = 0) (5)
where E(Vit+1 | dit = 0) denotes the discounted expected value of lifetime
earnings of starting to work in the labor market with t years of schooling, no
labor market experience and T − t years of potential speciﬁc human capital
accumulation ahead. Clearly,
E(Vit+1 | dit = 0) = E
T[
j=t+1
βj−(t+1)

(wij))1−α − 1
1− α

(6)
where
wij = exp(ϕ0 + ϕ1(Sij) + ϕ2Experij + ϕ3Exper2ij + εij)
Closed-form solution to the problem can be obtain by noting that
E(ViT ) = EU(exp(ln(ZiT ))) = E
(exp(ln(ZiT )))
1−α − 1
1− α (7)
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and that
] +∞
−∞
(exp(ln(ZiT )))1−α − 1
1− α fT (lnZi) d lnZi =
exp{µiT (1− α) + 12σ2T (1− α)2}− 1
1− α (8)
where ln(Zi) is normal with parameters µ
iT
and σ2T and where
µiT = ϕ0 + ϕ1(SiT ) + ϕ2ExperiT + ϕ3Exper2iT (9)
The expected utility of entering the labor market in any period can be solved
using recursive methods (see Bellman, 1959 or, more recently, Stokey and Lucas,
1989).
3 Empirical Speciﬁcation
In the sample data, everyone has at least 6 years of education, and as a conse-
quence, we only model the decision to acquire schooling beyond six years. We
also assume that the returns to accumulated education and experience at 65
(upon retirement) is 0 and that parental transfers are set to 0 upon entrance in
the labor market.
3.1 The Utility of Attending School
Parental transfers are given by the following equation,
ξit = exp(X 3itδ + υξi ) (10)
The vectorXit contains the following variables: parents’ education (both mother
and father), household income, number of siblings, family composition at age 14
and regional controls. The household composition variable (Nuclear Family) is
equal to 1 for those who have been raised with both their biological parents (at
age 14) and is likely to be correlated with the psychic costs of attending school.
The geographical variables are introduced in order to control for the possibility
that direct (as well as psychic) costs of schooling may diﬀer between those raised
in urban areas and those raised in rural areas and between those raised in the
South and those raised in the North. The term υξi represents unobserved taste
for schooling and is described in Section (3.4).
3.2 Wages and Employment Rates
Observed wages, ln w˜it, are assumed to be the sum of the true wage (lnwit) and
a measurement error (εmit ), so that the log wage (observed) regression is
ln w˜it = ϕw0 + ϕw1 (Sit) + ϕw2 Experit + ϕw3 Exper2it + υwi + εwit + εmit
9
where υwi is unobserved labor market ability aﬀecting wages and where εmit ∼
i.i.d. N(0,σ2m). Our speciﬁcation of the wage distribution therefore disregards
the existence of comparative advantages in schooling or wage growth, such as
those allowed in more general random coeﬃcient wage regression models, see
for instance Heckman and Vytlacil (1998) and Belzil and Hansen (2003).
The employment equation is
ln eit = κ0 + κ1Sit + κ2Experit + κ3Exper2it + υκi + εeit
where the term υκi captures the eﬀect of unobserved ability on employment
rates.
3.3 Earnings Dispersion and Education
As already mentioned above, we assume that the variance of wage and employ-
ment rates are heteroskedastic. The variances, σ2e(St) and σ2w(St), are given
by
σw(Sit) = exp(σw0 + σw1Sit + σw2S2it)
σe(Sit) = exp(σe0 + σe1Sit + σe2S2it)
3.4 Unobserved Ability in School and in the Labor Market
The intercept terms of the utility of attending school (υξi ), the employment
rate equation (υκi ) and of the log wage regression function (υwi ) are individual
speciﬁc. We assume that there are K types of individuals and that each type
is endowed with a vector of intercept terms (υξk, υκk , υwk ) for k = 1, 2...K and
K = 6.
The distribution of unobserved ability is orthogonal to parents’ background
by construction. As a consequence, the distribution of ability which we esti-
mate should be understood as a measure of unobserved ability remaining after
conditioning on parents human capital. The probability of belonging to type k,
pk, is estimated using logistic transforms
pk =
exp(q0k)S6
j=1 exp(q
0
j )
where the q03j s are parameters to be estimated (we normalize q
0
6 to 0).
3.5 Identiﬁcation
With data on wages, employment rates and schooling attainments, it is straight-
forward to identify the key parameters: the utility of attending school, the wage
return to schooling, the employment return to schooling and unobserved school
and market ability. This does not require further discussion (see Belzil and
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Hansen, 2002). The identiﬁcation of the degree of risk aversion (α) is also
straightforward to establish given knowledge of the variance of earnings (see
equation 8).
However, the identiﬁcation (and estimation) of a structural dynamic pro-
gramming model always requires some parametric assumptions.10For instance,
identiﬁcation of the subjective discount rate relies on the standard assumption
that preferences are time additive. Also, given that the model allows for unob-
served taste for schooling, it is unrealistic to account for other sources of prefer-
ence heterogeneity such as individual diﬀerences in risk aversion or in discount
rates. This means that, given parents’ background variables and unobserved
market ability, observed diﬀerences in schooling are automatically imputed to
diﬀerences in taste for schooling.11
3.6 Constructing the Likelihood
Dropping the individual subscript, the probability of investing in an additional
year of schooling at time t is given by
Pr(dt = 1) = Pr [V
s
t (St) ≥ V wt (St)]
= Pr
+
ξ1−α
t
−1
1−α + βE(Vt+1 | dt = 1) ≥
(exp(ln(Zt)))
1−α−1
1−α + βE(Vt+1 | dt = 0)
,
(11)
or, equivalently, as
Pr(dt = 1) = Pr



(1− α)Zt ≤
ln

ξ1−αt + (1− α)β[E(Vt+1 | dt = 1)−
E(Vt+1 | dt = 0)]




and can be expressed as follows
Pr(dt = 1) = Pr(εt ≤ [h(St)]) = Φ

h(St)
σw(t)

(12)
where
h(St) =
1
1− α ln

(1− α)

V st (St)−
βE(Vt+1 | dt = 0) + 11−α

− ϕ0 − ϕ1(St)
The likelihood function is constructed from data on schooling attainments
as well as data on the allocation of time between years spent in school (It =
0, dt = 1) and years during which school was interrupted (It = 1, dt = 1) and on
employment histories (wage/employment) observed when schooling acquisition
is terminated (until 1990). The construction of the likelihood function requires
us to evaluate the following probabilities:
 the probability of having spent at most τ years in school (including years
of interruption), Pr[(d0 = 1, I0), (d1 = 1, I1)....(dτ = 1, Iτ )] = L1 and is
easily evaluated using (11) and the deﬁnition of the interruption proba-
bility.
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 the probability of entering the labor market, in year τ + 1, at observed
wage w˜τ+1, P (dτ+1 = 0, w˜τ+1) = L2, which can easily be factored as the
product of a conditional times a marginal density.
 the density of observed wages and employment rates from τ + 2 until
1990, Pr ({w˜τ+2, eτ+2}..{w˜1990, e1990}) = L3, which is easily evaluated
using the fact that the random shocks aﬀecting the employment process
and the wage process are mutually independent.
The log likelihood function, for individual i, is then given by
lnLi = ln
K=6[
k=1
pk · L1i(k) · L2i(k) · L3i(k) (13)
where each pk represents the population proportion of type k.
4 The Data
The sample used in the analysis is extracted from the 1979 youth cohort of the
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The NLSY is a nationally
representative sample of 12,686 Americans who were 14-21 years old as of Janu-
ary 1, 1979. After the initial survey, re-interviews have been conducted in each
subsequent year until 1996. In this paper, we restrict our sample to white males
who were 20 years old or less as of January 1, 1979. We record information on
education, wages and on employment rates for each individual from the time
the individual is 16 up to December 31, 1990.
The original sample contained 3,790 white males. However, we lacked in-
formation on family background variables (such as family income as of 1978
and parents’ education). We lost about 17% of the sample due to missing in-
formation regarding family income and about 6% due to missing information
regarding parents’ education. The age limit and missing information regarding
actual work experience further reduced the sample to 1,710.
Descriptive statistics for the sample used in the estimation can be found in
Table A1 (in appendix). The education length variable is the reported highest
grade completed as of May 1 of the survey year and individuals are also asked if
they are currently enrolled in school or not.12This question allows us to identify
those individuals who are still acquiring schooling and therefore to take into ac-
count that education length is right-censored for some individuals. It also helps
us to identify those individuals who have interrupted schooling. Overall, the
majority of young individuals acquire education without interruption. The low
incidence of interruptions (Table A1) explains the low average number of inter-
ruptions per individual (0.06) and the very low average interruption duration
(0.43 year). In our sample, only 306 individuals have experienced at least one
interruption. This represents only 18% of our sample and it is along the lines of
results reported in Keane and Wolpin (1997).13Given the age of the individuals
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in our sample, we assume that those who have already started to work full-time
by 1990 (94% of our sample), will never return to school beyond 1990.
The average schooling completed (by 1990) is 12.8 years. From Table 1, it
is clear that the distribution of schooling attainments is bimodal. There is a
large fraction of young individuals who terminate school after 12 years (high
school graduation). The next largest frequency is at 16 years and corresponds
to college graduation. Altogether, more than half of the sample has obtained
either 12 or 16 years of schooling. As a consequence, one might expect that
either the wage return to schooling or the parental transfers vary substantially
with grade level. This question will be addressed below.
5 Structural Estimates and Goodness of Fit
In this section, we present a brief overview of some of the main structural
parameter estimates which do not raise immediate interest and evaluate the
goodness of ﬁt of the model. The parameter estimates (found in Table A2)
indicate that, other things equal, the utility of attending school increases with
parents’ education and income. This is well documented in various reduced-form
studies as well as in many structural studies (Cameron and Heckman, 1998;
Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999; Belzil and Hansen, 2002). The parameter estimates
characterizing the distribution of all individual speciﬁc intercept terms (school
ability, employment and wage regression and type probabilities) are also found
in Table A2. The diﬀerences in intercept terms across types are indicative of
the importance of unobserved ability aﬀecting wages, employment rates and the
utility of attending school.14The resulting type probabilities are 0.36 (type 1),
0.19 (type 2), 0.31 (type 3), 0.06 (type 4), 0.03 (type 5) and 0.06 (type 6). The
spline estimates of the local returns to schooling, also found in Table A2, can be
transformed into local returns (after adding up the proper parameters). More
details on the return to schooling can be found in Belzil and Hansen (2002).15
The predicted schooling attainments, along with actual frequencies are found
in Table 1, and allow us to evaluate the goodness of ﬁt. There is clear evidence
that our model is capable of ﬁtting the data well. In particular, our model is
capable of predicting the very large frequencies at the most frequent grade levels
(grade 12 and grade 16).
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
6 Risk Aversion, Earnings and Education: Some
Results
In this section, we discuss the three following issues: the degree or risk aver-
sion revealed in the data, the eﬀect of education on earnings dispersion (as
measured by the variances of wages and employment rates) and the eﬀect of a
counterfactual change in risk aversion on schooling attainment.
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6.1 The Degree of Risk Aversion
Given the objectives of the paper, the estimates of the preference parameters
are those that raise most interest. Our estimate of the discount rate, 0.0891,
appears quite reasonable. In practice, the willingness to trade current wages
for future wages is likely to be aﬀected by imperfections in the capital market.
The estimate of the degree of relative risk aversion, 0.9282 is however quite low
when compared to estimates cited in the ﬁnance literature.16In order to illustrate
the low degree of risk aversion, we examined the behavior toward risk of two
types of labor market entrants (a high school graduate and a college graduate).
Without loss of generality, we restrict ourself to a single period hourly wage
lottery which is characterized by the parameters of the log wage distribution.
We computed the certainty equivalent hourly wage rate and compared it with
the expected hourly wage rate resulting from the within period lottery. The
certainty equivalent is the certain wage rate, wc, at which wc = U−1(E(w)).
We have also computed the level of absolute risk aversion

−U 33(E(w))
U 3(E(w))

at the
expected entry wage. Both measures of risk aversion (absolute and relative) as
well as the expected wage and the certainty equivalent are found in Table 2.
They illustrate the very low degree of risk aversion. A high school graduate,
who obtain on average an hourly wage rate of $6.32, would be as well oﬀ with a
certain wage of $6.13. For a college graduate, the corresponding expected wage
and certainty equivalent are equal to $8.65 and $8.46.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
6.2 The Eﬀects of Education on Earnings Dispersion
In the empirical literature, homoskedasticity of the log wage regression function
is rarely questioned. With a structural dynamic programming model taking
into account individual unobserved heterogeneity, it is possible to distinguish
the distribution of unobserved ability from the distribution of stochastic wage
shocks. The variance of stochastic wage shocks is a measure of wage dispersion
and the eﬀect of schooling on wage and employment rate variances can easily
be computed. The quadratic speciﬁcation of the log wage variance, along with
estimates of σw0 (-1.3739), σw1 (0.0214) and σw2 (-0.0032), which are found
in Table A2, imply that wage dispersion will attain a maximum at 9 years of
schooling and decrease thereafter. In practice, this means that wage disper-
sion decreases signiﬁcantly with human capital for almost all individuals. At
the same time, the estimates for σe0 (-0.4084), σe1 (-0.1030) and σe2 (-0.0051)
imply that employment rate dispersion decreases monotonically with schooling
attainments.
In order to establish the links between risk and education more clearly, we
have computed the variances in lifetime wages, lifetime employment rates and
lifetime earnings for all possible levels of schooling. All variances are measured
over a period of 45 years of potential experience. The results are in Table 3.
The decrease in employment rate and wage dispersion with schooling is well
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illustrated in columns 1 and 2. As earnings are deﬁned as the product of an
hourly wage rate times an employment rate, the variance in lifetime earnings
also decreases dramatically with schooling attainments. The evidence suggests
that schooling acquisition implies a signiﬁcant reduction in total risk.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
6.3 The Eﬀect of Risk Aversion on Education
After having established the link between education and earnings dispersion, it
is natural to investigate the relationship between risk aversion and education.
As explained earlier, it is unrealistic to account for other sources of preference
heterogeneity such as individual diﬀerences in risk aversion or in discount rates.
While our model has been estimated under the assumption that preferences are
homogenous (individuals diﬀer only in terms of ability), it is easy to evaluate
how mean schooling attainments change with a counterfactual change in risk
aversion. This counterfactual experiment may be viewed as an evaluation of
the importance of the diﬀerences in schooling attainments between various sub-
groups of the population endowed with diﬀerent levels of risk aversion. For the
sake of comparison with the results usually reported in the empirical ﬁnance
literature, we have computed mean schooling attainments for levels of relative
risk aversion between 0.93 and 3.00. These are found in Table 4. These sim-
ulations indicate that, over the range considered, mean schooling attainments
will increase with risk aversion. For instance, at a relatively high degree of risk
aversion such as α = 3.0, individuals would obtain, on average, 18.50 years of
schooling.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
7 Some Elasticities of Schooling Attainments
In this section, we evaluate the elasticities of mean schooling attainments with
respect to changes in some of the key parameters of the model. In particular, we
investigate individual reactions to changes in the wage and employment returns
to schooling as well as changes in schooling attainments due to changes in school
and wage subsidies.
7.1 How Do People React to Changes in the Returns to
Education
Using counterfactual changes in the return to schooling, it is easy to evaluate
mean schooling attainments elasticities. As the wage return to schooling is
estimated ﬂexibly, we simulated changes in the overall return and also simulated
changes in the return to college graduation. The elasticities with respect to the
wage return, reported in Table 5, are 0.35 (for an overall increase) and 0.11
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(for an increase in the return to college graduation). Schooling attainments are
therefore relatively inelastic with respect to the wage return to schooling.
7.2 How Do People React to Changes in School Subsidies
and Wage Subsidies
As for the wage return to schooling, it is possible to evaluate the elasticities
of schooling attainments with respect to an overall increase in the income sup-
port while at school (school subsidies) or a subsidy to post high-school edu-
cation.17As expected, the elasticity with respect to a general increase (1.01)
exceeds the elasticity to post high-school education (0.46). When compared to
the elasticities reported in Section 7.1, these elasticities indicate that individual
are more responsive to school subsidies (or parental transfers) than to the return
to schooling. Finally, by increasing the intercept term of the wage regression,
it is possible to simulate the eﬀect of a wage subsidy. It is well known that an
overall increase in wages will result in an increase in the opportunity costs of
schooling. Not surprisingly, our results indicate that the elasticity of schooling
attainments with respect to a wage increase is negative (-0.70).
As a conclusion, schooling attainments appear more sensitive to changes
in the utility of attending school than to changes in the return to schooling.
This is consistent with ﬁndings reported in Keane and Wolpin (1997), Eckstein
and Wolpin (1999), and Belzil and Hansen (2002) and can be explained by the
importance of individual diﬀerences in school ability.
7.3 How do people react to changes in risk
Our ﬂexible speciﬁcations of the log wage and the log employment regression
functions allow us to investigate how individuals react to changes in risk. In
particular, the heteroskedastic function for the variances allow us to evaluate
the eﬀects of an overall change in earnings dispersion. In order to do so, we
must change the variance of the log earnings regression (σ) and adjust the mean
of log earnings (µ) so that only earnings dispersion is changed.18
The elasticity with respect to a change in risk is found to be small and
positive (0.07). The positive sign can be explained as follows. An increase in
earnings risk makes parental transfers relatively more appealing for risk averse
individuals. As a consequence, young individuals respond by staying in school
longer. However, given the very low level of risk aversion, the eﬀect is small.
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
8 Conclusion
We have estimated a dynamic programming model of schooling decisions in
which risk averse individuals make optimal sequential schooling decisions based
on the fact that schooling aﬀects both the mean and the variance of lifetime
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wages and employment rates. Our model ﬁts the data quite well and the results
indicate that individuals have a very low degree of risk (relative) aversion. The
parameter estimate of the degree of risk aversion, 0.93, is just somewhat below
the degree of risk aversion implied by logarithmic preferences. At the same
time, our estimates of log wage and log employment rate regression functions
indicate that, after conditioning on individual speciﬁc unobserved ability, wage
dispersion and employment rate dispersion are highly heteroskedastic. More
precisely, both wage and employment rate dispersions decrease with schooling.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that risk sharing agreements are more
common among highly educated (high wage) workers. Not surprisingly, mean
schooling attainments are found to be increasing in risk aversion, that is, a
counterfactual increase in the degree of risk aversion will increase schooling
attainments.
Finally, we have used our model to simulate the eﬀects of a change in the
returns to education, a change in school (and wage) subsidies and a change
in risk on expected schooling attainments. The results indicate that schooling
attainments are relatively more elastic with respect to school subsidies than to
the return to schooling. Consistent with the low degree of risk aversion disclosed
in the data, an increase in earnings dispersion (an increase in the overall variance
of wages and employment rates) will raise schooling by a relatively small number
and the elasticity is quite small (around 0.07).
These ﬁndings suggest avenues for future research. As education can play the
role of self-insurance, it would be interesting to analyze the optimality of social
insurance in a context where human capital (schooling) is a substitute for social
insurance. It would also be interesting to analyze optimal schooling decisions
in a context where workers can explicitly enter contractual agreements with
potential employers. We leave these potential extensions for future research.
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Notes:
1 For a survey of the contract literature, see Rosen (1985).
2 While it is generally accepted by most economists that income/wage uncer-
tainty should reduce schooling, Kodde (1986) ﬁnds empirical evidence in favor of
a positive relationship between income uncertainty and schooling attainments.
His results are obtained from self-reported expectation data of Dutch students.
3 In a standard recursive utility framework, such as the one used in this pa-
per, there is a one-to-one correspondence betwen the degree of risk aversion and
the willingness to smooth consumption (intertemporal substitution). Disentan-
gling the behavior toward risk from the willingness to smooth consumption is
beyond the scope of this paper.
4 However, the link between schooling acquisition and capital markets had
been discussed in the earlier literature. See Ben-Porath (1967) and Johnson
(1978), among others, for discussions relating to various education ﬁnancing
issues.
5 It is well known that, in order to solve the “Equity premium Puzzle”, the
degree of relative risk aversion must be very large (at least above 50). For a
review of the literature, see Kocherlakota (1996).
6 In most western countries, labor income account for 60% to 70% of total
income.
7 We assume that individuals cannot borrow during school.
8 A similar assumption is made in Johnson (1978).
9 In the NLSY, we ﬁnd that more than 82% of the sample has never expe-
rienced school interruption.
10 The degree of under-identiﬁcation arising in the dynamic programming
literature is discussed in Rust (1994) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002).
11 While another possible estimation strategy could have been to include
AFQT scores in the intercept terms of both the utility of attending school and
the log wage regression function, we are reluctant to do so. This approach
could lead to an understatement of the eﬀects of schooling on wages and an
understatement of risk aversion heterogeneity, if AFQT scores are themselves
explained by schooling.
12 This feature of the NLSY implies that there is a relatively low level of
measurement error in the education variable.
13 Overall, interruptions tend to be quite short. Almost half of the individu-
als (45 %) who experienced an interruption, returned to school within one year
while 73% returned within 3 years.
14 Similar results are reported in Keane and Wolpin (1997), Eckstein and
Wolpin (2000), and Belzil and Hansen (2002).
15 Belzil and Hansen (2002) argue that the returns to schooling are much
lower than those reported previously in the literature and ﬁnd evidence that the
log wage regression is highly convex in schooling.
16 See Kocherlakota (1996).
17 In the NLSY, we are unable to observe tuition costs and we assume that
an increase in the income support while at school can proxy school subsidies.
20
18 Note that log normality implies that E(Z) = exp(µ+0.5σ2) and V ar(Z) =
exp(2µ+ σ2)(exp(σ2)− 1).
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Table 1
Model Fit: Actual vs Predicted Schooling Attainments
Grade Level Predicted (%) Actual (%)
6 0.0% 0.3 %
7 1.7% 0.6%
8 2.2% 2.9%
9 5.2% 4.7%
10 7.0% 6.0 %
11 8.9% 7.5 %
12 45.3% 39.6 %
13 5.8% 7.0 %
14 5.1% 7.7 %
15 1.5% 2.9 %
16 9.1% 12.9 %
17 5.1% 2.5 %
18 2.1% 2.4%
19 1.0% 1.3%
20-more 0.2% 1.6%
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Table 2
Measures of Risk Aversion
High School College
Graduates Graduates
Relative Risk aversion 0.9282 0.9282
(α)
Absolute Risk aversion 0.1469 0.1073
−U33(E(w))
U 3(E(w))
Expected wage (E(W)) 6.3183 8.6478
Certainty equivalent 6.1337 8.4579
(wc = U
−1(E(w)))
Note: The degree of relative risk aversion, α, is also equal to -wU”(E(w))
U3(E(w)) . The
absolute degree of risk aversion is deﬁned as -U”(E(w))
U3(E(w)) . The certainty equivalent
wage, wc, is deﬁned as the solution of the following equation: wc = U
−1(E(w)).
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Table 3
Schooling Attainments and the variances of lifetime wages,
employment rates and earnings
Variance of Variance of Variance of
Emp. rates (log) Wages (log) Earnings (log)
grade level
7 16.02 2.99 19.01
8 12.64 3.06 15.70
9 9.78 3.09 12.87
10 7.41 3.09 10.50
11 5.50 3.04 8.54
12 4.00 2.96 6.96
13 2.85 2.84 5.70
14 1.99 2.70 4.69
15 1.36 2.52 3.89
16 0.91 2.33 3.25
17-more 0.60 2.13 2.73
Note: Variances are computed over a period of 45 years of potential experi-
ence.
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Table 4
Risk Aversion and Expected Schooling Attainments
Relative Risk Mean
Aversion (α) Schooling
α = 0.93 12.45 years
α = 1.00 12.49 years
α = 1.5 13.65 years
α = 2.0 16.19 years
α = 3.0 18.50 years
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Table 5
Various Elasticities of Expected Schooling Attainments
Parameters elasticities
Wage Return
all levels 0.35
grade 16 0.11
School Subsidies
all levels 1.01
post high school 0.46
Wage subsidies -0.70
Risk
Earnings (σ2) 0.0700
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics.
Mean St dev. Number of individuals
Family Income/1000 36,904 27.61 1710
Father’s educ 11.69 3.47 1710
Mother’s educ 11.67 2.46 1710
Number of siblings 3.18 2.13 1710
Prop. raised in urban areas 0.73 - 1710
Prop. raised in south 0.27 - 1710
Prop in nuclear family 0.79 - 1710
Schooling completed (1990) 12.81 2.58 1710
Number of interruptions 0.06 0.51 1710
Duration of interruptions (year) 0.43 1.39 1710
Wage 1979 (hour) 7.36 2.43 217
Wage 1980 (hour) 7.17 2.74 422
Wage 1981 (hour) 7.18 2.75 598
Wage 1982 (hour) 7.43 3.17 819
Wage 1983 (hour) 7.35 3.21 947
Wage 1984 (hour) 7.66 3.60 1071
Wage 1985 (hour) 8.08 3.54 1060
Wage 1986 (hour) 8.75 3.87 1097
Wage 1987 (hour) 9.64 4.44 1147
Wage 1988 (hour) 10.32 4.89 1215
Wage 1989 (hour) 10.47 4.97 1232
Wage 1990 (hour) 10.99 5.23 1230
Experience 1990 (years) 8.05 11.55 1230
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Table A2. Structural Parameter Estimates.
Parameter Std error
Utility in School
Father’s Educ 0.0158 0.0010
Mother’s Educ 0.0115 0.0011
Family Income/1000 0.0009 0.0002
Nuclear Family 0.0382 0.0050
Siblings -0.0108 0.0010
Rural -0.0071 0.0091
South -0.0209 0.0099
Risk Aversion 0.9282 0.0390
Discount Rate 0.0891 0.0031
Employment
Schooling 0.0116 0.0010
Exper. 0.0027 0.0005
Exper2. -0.0001 0.0000
σe0 (intercept) -0.4084 0.0372
σe1 (schooling) -0.1030 0.0120
σe2 (schooling2) -0.0051 0.0009
Wages
spline 7-10 0.0070 0.0045
spline 11 0.0030 0.0004
spline 12 0.0407 0.0048
spline 13 -0.0820 0.0040
spline 14 0.0680 0.0046
spline 15 -0.0305 0.0053
spline 16 0.0489 0.0067
spline 17-more -0.0325 0.0038
Exper 0.1034 0.0044
Exper2 -0.0044 0.0004
σw0 (intercept) -1.3739 0.0302
σw1 (schooling) 0.0214 0.0102
σw2 (schooling2) -0.0032 0.0010
Measurement error
σ2m 0.1444 0.0016
interruption prob
ζ7 0.0124 0.0103
ζ8 0.0621 0.0234
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Table A2. Structural Parameter Estimates, Continued.
Parameter Std error
ζ9 0.0937 0.0248
ζ10 0.0270 0.0249
ζ11 0.1167 0.0072
ζ12 0.3420 0.0190
ζ13 0.1004 0.0476
ζ14 0.1217 0.0216
ζ15−more 0.1220 0.0119
Unobs. Hetero.
Type 1
School ab. (υξ1) -1.2147 0.0473
Wage (υw1 ) 1.3463 0.0094
Employment υκ1 -3.3629 0.0301
Type Prob. (q01) 1.6875 0.0419
Type 2
School ab. (υξ2) -0.8354 0.0481
Wage ab. (υw1 ) 1.6785 0.0192
Employment υκ1 -0.1615 0.0113
Type Prob (q02) 1.0255 0.0378
Type 3
School ab. (υξ3) -1.4983 0.0453
Wage (υw1 ) 1.0529 0.0121
Employment (υκ1) -0.1560 0.0241
Type Prob (q03) 1.5402 0.0098
Type 4
School ab. (υξ4) -1.8252 0.0532
Wage (υw4 ) 1.1546 0.0112
Employment (υκ1) -0.5491 0.0204
Type Prob (q04) 0.1578 0.1396
Type 5
School ab. (υξ5) -2.3599 0.0538
Wage (υw1 ) 1.2591 0.0121
Employment (υκ1) -1.0950 0.0269
Type Prob (q05) -1.1992 0.1913
Type 6
School ab. (υξ6) -1.8127 0.0456
Wage (υw1 ) 0.7072 0.0106
Employment (υκ1) -0.2005 0.0141
Type Prob (q06) 0.0 (normalized)
Mean Log Likelihood -8.02289
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